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RECENT DEVELOPMENT 
MCQUITTYv. SPANGLER: A CLAIM FOR BREACH OF DUTY 
TO OBTAIN INFORMED CONSENT DOES NOT REQUIRE 
EVIDENCE OF A PHYSICAL INVASION. 
By: Heather Pensyl 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that it is not necessary to prove that a physical invasion occurred in order to bring a claim 
for breach of informed consent. McQuitty v. Spangler, 410 Md. 1, 976 
A.2d 1020 (2009). Specifically, the court held that a sufficient claim 
for lack of informed consent arose when a physician failed to provide 
the patient with material information necessary to make a treatment 
decision, regardless of the presence of any physical invasion. ld. at 5, 
976 A.2d at 1022. 
On March 30, 1995, while twenty-eight weeks pregnant, Peggy 
McQuitty experienced a premature separation of the placenta from the 
uterus, known as a partial placental abruption. Mrs. McQuitty's 
attending physician, Dr. Donald Spangler, advised Mrs. McQuitty that 
a scheduled Cesarean Section delivery would be necessary. The 
timing of such posed a dilemma, however, because any further delay 
would increase the risk of additional separation of the placenta, and a 
complete abruption would cause the death of the fetus. Yet, if Dr. 
Spangler delivered the baby immediately, the fetus' lung immaturity 
also posed a risk of death. Accordingly, Dr. Spangler developed a 
management plan to delay the delivery, and Mrs. McQuitty consented 
to this plan. 
About a week and a half later, a new abruption occurred, which 
was followed by further complications. Dr. Spangler never presented 
the option of delivering the baby, nor did he advise Mrs. McQuitty of 
the additional risks associated with the new complications. On May 8, 
1995, a complete abruption occurred and Dr. Spangler conducted an 
emergency Cesarean Section. The complete abruption caused the 
child's severe cerebral palsy, which, according to testimony at trial, 
could have been avoided had the baby been delivered sooner. 
On September 5, 2001, Mrs. McQuitty and her husband filed a 
complaint in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County against Dr. 
Spangler for malpractice and breach of the duty to obtain informed 
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consent. During the trial, the jury reached a verdict regarding the 
malpractice claim, but failed to do so regarding the informed consent 
claim. Two years later, at a second trial, addressing only the issue of 
informed consent, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the McQuittys 
and awarded damages of $13,078,515. However, the judge granted 
Dr. Spangler's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the 
basis that there was no "affirmative violation of Mrs. McQuitty's 
physical integrity." The McQuittys appealed to the Court of Special 
Appeals of Maryland, which affirmed the trial court's holding. The 
McQuittys then petitioned the Court of Appeals of Maryland for a writ 
of certiorari, which the court granted. 
In its analysis of the case, the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
addressed the following issues related to informed consent: (1) 
whether a physician's withholding of material information from his 
patient, concerning changes in medical status, would give rise to an 
informed consent claim by negating any prior consent given regarding 
treatment, and (2) whether, under Maryland law, an informed consent 
claim could exist in the absence of damages caused by battery. 
McQuitty, 410 Md. at 4, 976 A.2d at 1022. 
First, the court noted that in order to be effective, consent must be 
informed. /d. at 19,976 A.2d at 1031. Informed consent requires that 
a physician provide all information material to the patient's decision to 
pursue a particular line of treatment. /d. (citing Sard v. Hardy, 281 
Md. 432, 444, 379 A.2d 1014, 1019-20 (1977)). Additionally, 
informed consent includes a duty to warn the patient of any material 
risks or dangers that correlate with such treatment. /d. at 21, 976 A.2d 
at 1032. This duty does not require that the physician inform the 
patient of all risks; the physician must only disclose those that the 
physician knows, or ought to know, that a reasonable patient would 
find important in making his or her decision. /d. (quoting Sard, 281 
Md. at 444, 379 A.2d at 1022). Thus, as in Mrs. McQuitty's case, 
when a physician fails to inform the patient of changes in 
circumstances and how those changes affect the risks inherent in a 
course of treatment, an informed consent claim arises. /d. at 3, 5, 976 
A.2d at 1021-22. 
The court then addressed whether a physical invasion requirement 
exists under the doctrine of informed consent. McQuitty, 410 Md. at 
17, 976 A.2d at 1029. Dr. Spangler argued that the duty to obtain 
informed consent arises only when a physician proposes a treatment 
involving an "affirmative violation of the patient's physical 
integrity." Id. at 18, 976 A.2d at 1030 (quoting Land v. Zorn, 389 
Md. 206, 230, 884 A.2d 142, 156 (2005); Reed v. Compagnolo, 332 
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Md. 226, 242, 630 A.2d 1145, 1153 (1993)). In rejecting Dr. 
Spangler's argument, the court relied on the historical common law 
basis for an informed consent claim. !d. at 26, 976 A.2d at 1035. As 
early as 1767, an informed consent claim could be pled on the case. 
!d. at 26, 976 A.2d at 1035 (citing Slater v. Baker & Stapleton, 95 
Eng. Rep. 860 (K.B. 1767)). This cause of action was a precursor to 
negligence, rather than an action in battery. !d. (citing Slater, 95 Eng. 
Rep. 860). Thus, traditionally, the gravamen of a claim for lack of 
informed consent rested in the physician's duty to obtain consent to 
treatment. !d. at 28, 976 A.2d at 1036. Subsequent courts have 
interpreted this as a duty to provide the patient with all material 
information relevant to the patient's decision to pursue treatment. 
McQuitty, 410 Md. at 31, 976 A.2d at 1038 (citing Sard, 281 Md. at 
444,372 A.2d at 1022). 
Next, the court analyzed Reed v. Carnpagnolo, wherein it held that 
a physician's failure to offer diagnostic tests should be analyzed under 
the professional standard of care, not the doctrine of informed consent. 
!d. at 25, 976 A.2d at 1034-35 (citing Reed v. Campagnolo, 332 Md. 
226, 242-43, 630 A.2d 1143, 1152-53 (1993)). Additionally, the court 
in Reed held that the duty to obtain informed consent only arose when 
a physician failed to obtain consent to some treatment. !d. at 23, 976 
A.2d at 1033 (citing Reed, 332 Md. at 241, 630 A.2d at 1152). In an 
attempt to distinguish the situation under which the doctrine of 
informed consent applied from a medical malpractice claim, the Reed 
court referenced Karlsons v. Guerino/, which held that an informed 
consent claim could not exist without '"an affirmative violation of the 
patient's physical integrity."' !d. at 22, 976 A.2d at 1032-33 (quoting 
Karlsons v. Guerino/, 57 A.D.2d. 73, 82, 394 N.Y.S.2d 933, 939 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1977)). This reference to Karlsons departed from the 
common law basis for an informed consent claim, and resulted in the 
view that an informed consent claim necessitated the additional 
element of a physical invasion. !d. at 26, 976 A.2d at 1035. 
The court in McQuitty clarified this uncertainty and delineated the 
correct approach: a claim for lack of informed consent rests in 
negligence, rather than battery. !d. at 29, 976 A.2d at 1036-37. The 
court indicated that to require a physical invasion would contradict the 
underlying basis for the informed consent doctrine, which is to 
promote the patient's choice and personal autonomy. McQuitty, 410 
Md. at 31, 976 A.2d at 1038. Accordingly, the court held that there 
exists no requirement of a physical invasion in the informed consent 
doctrine. !d. at 33, 976 A.2d at 1039. 
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By clarifying contradictory precedent, the court in McQuitty 
reconnected the informed consent doctrine with its common law 
origins in the law of negligence. The court reaffirmed the informed 
consent doctrine's strength with regard to ensuring the patient's right 
to make informed decisions about procedures and treatments that 
personally affect the patient. Requiring a patient to show evidence of 
battery in order to sustain an informed consent claim would have 
severely limited the doctrine's power. Thus, without the requirement 
of a physical invasion, a lower threshold exists for patients to bring 
claims for lack of informed consent, allowing legal practitioners to 
assert the patients' rights more readily. As a result of this decision, the 
amount of successful informed consent cases may increase. 
